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This paper uses employee and patient survey data from a large, integrated healthcare 
provider to assess the moderating role that employee involvement (EI) plays in the 
effectiveness of a patient scheduling module that is part of an electronic health record (EHR) 
system.  The author finds that while the module facilitated the appointment-making process, its 
effects were greater in those clinics that sought input from frontline workers and made use of 
worker peers trained as system “super-users.”  This case of workplace technological change 
begins to explain the elusiveness of the EI-performance link in received studies by suggesting 
an alternative avenue by which EI can improve organizational performance.  Moreover, this 
study presents the first empirical evidence of EI’s potential to enhance the effectiveness of 
health IT, findings that should inform policymakers and sectoral actors as they allocate 
substantial resources toward the healthcare industry’s transition from paper-based to electronic 
recordkeeping. 
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Newcomers to the study of work and employment might be surprised to learn of the 
elusiveness of the link between employee involvement (EI) and organizational performance.  In 
fact, despite the long-term interest of scholars of organizational behavior (OB), human 
resources (HR), and employment relations (ER), among other fields, the connection between EI 
and performance is far from universal.  At the same time, the widespread diffusion of 
information technology (IT) over the last two decades has heightened our need to understand 
how human and technological capital interface in production.  Since it has been shown, for 
example, that many of the benefits once assumed to arise from IT actually arise through the 
interplay of IT and features of the employment relationship (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 
2002; Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang 2002), could the converse be true—that the productivity 
gains anticipated of EI are actually channeled through the effective implementation of new 
technologies? 
The extent to which EI in the implementation of IT tightens the link between each of 
these inputs and measures of productivity has immediate implications for both policy and 
research.  From a policy perspective, nowhere is the need to answer this question more acute 
than in the healthcare sector.  There is near universal agreement that the industry requires 
major reform and that diffusion of health IT is critical to improving efficiency and service 
quality—a belief backed up by billions of dollars in government incentives to those adopting 
electronic health records (EHRs).  For example, the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act allocated $46 billion of economic stimulus funds 
towards advancing EHR technologies.  Reformers justify the allocation of these resources by 
blaming the slow diffusion of health IT for the poor performance of the healthcare industry, 
marked by skyrocketing costs and poor quality outcomes relative to other countries (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2007).  The Obama administration, citing a RAND Corporation study 
(Hillestad et al. 2005), points to a projected annual savings of $81 billion from the effective 
deployment of health IT systems. 
However, to date policymakers have little or no empirical evidence to support their 
optimistic expectations or data on the organizational or employment conditions needed to 
translate these new technologies into improved performance outcomes.  Yet, if results from 
studies of investments in technologies in other industries (Batt 1999; MacDuffie and Krafcik 
1992) generalize to healthcare, there is reason to question whether a “technology alone” 
strategy will realize policymakers’ expectations.  Instead, these studies have demonstrated that 
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technological investments need to be complemented with employment and organizational 
practices to achieve their desired results. 
Likewise, if the theorized complementarity obtains, the results could help piece-together 
what has been a theoretical and empirical puzzle by revealing a common situation in which EI 
can be a positive driver of performance.  This would explain why managers maintain this belief 
and continue to rely on EI despite the dearth of empirical evidence in its favor (Freeman and 
Kleiner 2000).  That is, beneficial effects of EI may come through the implementation of new 
technologies.  This makes sense if EI structures and processes allow for two-way 
communication between the strategic and workplace levels as well as for frontline involvement 
in training and optimization around the new technology.  Therefore, the extent to which 
employee involvement in the implementation of a new IT system moderates the effectiveness of 
the technology is a question with immediate consequences in both the research and policy 
realms. 
This paper begins to address this issue by testing for the performance effects of a 
specific type of health IT at varying levels of EI.  It does so by examining the implementation 
of one piece of an EHR system, a scheduling module, across a single region of Kaiser 
Permanente, the nation’s largest, not-for-profit health plan.  I first draw on qualitative, 
observational data to develop an understanding of the processes by which the scheduling 
module facilitates the work of frontline employees.  This stage of data-gathering also allows me 
to identify performance measures most directly tied to the effective use of this particular 
technology, outcomes that are of interest to the organization itself and that are measured 
reliably across clinics over time.  Furthermore, I determine the specific ways in which workers 
and union representatives are involved in the development, deployment, and use of the IT, 
particularly those forms of EI that the organization believes will improve the effectiveness of 
the scheduling module.  This qualitative evidence is then used to develop context-specific 
measures of the EI practices and IT in-use and to conduct a longitudinal analysis of the 
individual and joint effects of IT and EI on performance across multiple healthcare clinics. 
The study offers a number of advantages over existing ones.  It allows us to hold 
constant many of the unobservable contextual factors that remain unaccounted for in national, 
cross-industry studies of IT’s performance effects (e.g., Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang 2002; 
Caroli and van Reenan 2001).  In particular, it leverages the strength of a case study approach, 
studying a very specific, well-defined technological change—something that cannot be done in 
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national studies where IT is frequently defined rather vaguely (Brown and Campbell 2002) and 
has yet to be done even in more-grounded studies of EI and IT (Mirvis, Sales, and Hackett 
1991).  Likewise, rather than relying on measures of revenue or profit, it relies on a 
contextually-appropriate, homogenous performance measure as suggested by Ichniowski, 
Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) and MacDuffie (1995).  The paper also supplements more-
grounded examinations of employment practices and IT developed largely in manufacturing 
rather than in the service sector. 
 
Employee Involvement and Technological Change 
Employee Involvement in Human Resources and Organizational Behavior 
The fields of Human Resources (HR) and Organizational Behavior (OB) offer a far-
reaching literature on EI, theorizing the effects of “participation” largely through a 
psychological or motivational lens.  In the US, empirical analyses date at least as far back as the 
Hawthorne (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939) and Harwood (Coch and French 1948) studies.  
These foundational pieces from the “human relations” school first came to symbolize the 
benefits attendant to participation, but were later (and famously) maligned for their 
methodological shortcomings.  Subsequent and more careful analyses of EI yield a much more 
cautious view of its instrumentality over organizational performance.  Motivated by anecdotal 
and ideological accounts of the importance of EI, Locke and Schweiger’s (1979) extensive 
review concluded that while participation may drive job satisfaction, it does not reliably 
influence productivity. 
In the absence of evidence of a universal relationship, HR and OB theorists have at least 
sought to answer two overarching questions.  Contingency theories (e.g., Vroom and Yetton 
1973) attempted to explain when or under what organizational conditions EI should be used to 
boost performance.  Though contingency models examining employee-level traits and the 
appropriateness of different types of decisions find little support in the data (Miller and Monge 
1986), more organizationally-grounded approaches, indeed, find support for a link between EI 
and performance.  Kanter’s (1983) empirical work, for example, suggested that EI was 
appropriate for frontline staff if they had knowledge or expertise—tacit or explicit—not 
available at higher ranks within the organization, results that have since been replicated and 
generalized (Latham, Winters, and Locke 1994; McCaffrey, Faerman, and Hart 1995; Scully, 
Kirkpatrick, and Locke 1995).  Aside from asking when EI might boost performance, HR and 
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OB research has examined how EI should be implemented to promote its performance benefits.  
That is, ascribing Locke and Schweiger’s (1979) “non-results” to a unitary conceptualization of 
participation, research sought to determine what institutional forms of EI might strengthen the 
link between EI and performance.  The findings suggested that self-directed teams in which EI 
centers around everyday work are much more likely to drive performance than are weaker 
forms of participation, such as offline problem-solving groups or quality circles (Cotton, 
Vollrath, Froggatt, Lengnick-Hall, and Jennings 1988; Cotton 1993).  However, even this 
seemingly safe conclusion has been called into question on methodological grounds (Leana, 
Locke, and Schweiger 1990). 
The HR and OB literatures diverge with respect to their treatment of technology.  The 
work of Edmondson and colleagues exemplifies OB’s nuanced examination of the role of 
technology in organizations.  Channeling Kanter’s conceptualization of frontline worker 
knowledge, they explain the effectiveness of new technologies as a consequence of the form of 
worker knowledge—tacit or codified—required to more-fully leverage new technologies 
(2001).  In a related, qualitative study, they examine the collective learning process of those 
responsible for implementing the same technology, arguing that the deep entrenchment of 
routines developed around old technologies can limit the success of new ones (2003).  The need 
to realign workflows around new technologies certainly applies to the technological change to 
be examined in this paper.  However, in Edmondson, Winslow, Bohmer, and Pisano (2003), the 
resistance stems from the deep-seated nature of hierarchical relations in an organization, 
hospitals in this case, and the high level of task interdependence required for the effective use of 
the technology under study. 
Interestingly, while OB, in particular, cares a great deal about the role of technology in 
organizations generally, neither HR nor OB reserves a place for technology in theory linking 
HR practices to organizational performance (Becker and Huselid 1998; Becker and Huselid 
2010).  One notable exception on the HR side is Mirvis, Sales, and Hackett’s (1991) comparison 
of two very different technologies—computerized machinery in a metal fabrication factory and 
word processing technology in a publishing company.  They concluded that a top-down 
deployment strategy like that used in the factory appeared less effective than the more 
participatory, training-focused strategy employed in the publishing house.  However, their 
findings are undermined by an “apples to oranges” research design, and more widely-cited 
contributions to the HR literature are much more likely to treat technology solely as a source 
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of measurement error (Huselid and Becker 1996; Locke and Schweiger 1979) rather than as an 
appropriate object of study.  As a result, despite a wealth of theoretical and empirical work 
linking EI to performance, HR and OB research has yet to fully examine EI and IT in tandem.  
That is, it has yet to explicitly and carefully consider the possibility that EI’s empirically 
elusive performance effects may come through its moderation of the technology-performance 
link. 
 
Employee Involvement and Technological Change in Employment Relations 
Scholars of work and employment, on the other hand, have an abiding interest in what 
Dunlop (1958 [1993]) labeled the “technological context.”  Marxists, of course, portray new 
technologies and the technological change process as a deliberate strategy on the part of 
managers to tighten control over workers and the labor process through de-skilling 
(Braverman 1974; Marx 1849 [1978]).  This point-of-view though has been widely criticized as 
deterministic, charting at least two paths on which to advance theory.  Science and technology 
studies (STS), though more focused on “technologies of consumption” rather than the realm of 
production (cf. Noble 1984; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2007, p.556), counters deterministic 
approaches by examining the ways that actual users of technology as well as the social 
environment more broadly shape characteristics of new technologies, implying that emergent 
manifestations of IT and the impact of new hardware and software, for example, depends on 
early-stage “negotiations” between the relevant actors. 
In contrast to this focus on agency in technological change, pluralist industrial 
relations, i.e., employment relations, adopts more of an institutional perspective, paying very 
close attention to the interplay of technology and EI in production.  Over the past three 
decades, ER research has delivered a growing body of evidence on the effects of technology and 
workplace practices, motivated in part by the highly visible and widely reported early 
experiences of General Motors (GM) and others in the auto industry with investments in 
automation.  Case study research documented that in the 1980s, GM invested billions of dollars 
in automation technology—$650 million in one GM factory alone (Kochan 1988)—but did not 
achieve the expected performance improvements or achieve the levels of performance observed 
in Japanese plants in North America or in Japan (Krafcik 1988).  Instead, follow-up case study 
and quantitative analyses demonstrated that it was the combination of new technologies and 
innovative employment practices that positioned shop floor workers to “give wisdom to the 
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machine” (MacDuffie and Krafcik 1992; MacDuffie 1995) that delivered these levels of 
performance.  This evidence suggested that a “bundle” of innovative employment practices, 
inclusive of opportunities for worker involvement in problem solving, moderated the return on 
investments in new technologies.1
These results have subsequently been replicated in other manufacturing settings and 
even a few service industries.  Kelley (1996), for example, shows that increased computerization 
in the machined products sector drives larger productivity gains in firms that involve workers 
through participatory structures.  Batt (1999) found that telecommunications sales 
representatives with access to new technology outperformed those not using IT, and that the 
size of the performance increment was greater for those workers reporting high levels of 
involvement in problem-solving and participation. 
 
Interestingly, ER research focused on EI and performance to the exclusion of 
technology have been unable to establish a conclusive link between EI and economic 
performance (Cappelli and Neumark 2001; Freeman and Kleiner 2000; Kleiner, Leonard, and 
Pilarski 2001).  Appelbaum and Batt (1994) suggest that measurement error may be the 
problem, as neither researchers nor practitioners have a single, shared understanding of the 
meaning of EI or how it actually occurs in workplaces.  Instead, the dominant finding in the 
literature on high-performance work systems (HPWS) has identified “bundles” or clusters of 
employment practices as opposed to individual practices as significant drivers of economic 
performance (e.g., Becker and Huselid 1998; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997; MacDuffie 
1995).  Of course, the instrumentality of EI-inclusive bundles of employment practices also 
stands on firm theoretical ground.  It is now widely accepted that workers will only share their 
valuable, often tacit, production-related information if they are invited to do so, have the 
appropriate skills to do so, and are given the appropriate incentives (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, 
and Kalleberg 2000; Becker and Huselid 1998; MacDuffie 1995).  Furthermore, consistent with 
aforementioned findings from HR and OB (Cotton, Vollrath, Froggatt, Lengnick-Hall, and 
Jennings 1988; Cotton 1993), it also appears that not all forms of EI “pack the same 
performance punch.”  That is, purely consultative, offline forms of EI such as the “quality 
circles” popularized in the 1980s and 1990s, generally yield weak performance improvements, if 
any (Levine and Tyson 1990). 
                                                                
1 Interestingly, MacDuffie’s (1995) groundbreaking empirical study measured technology very carefully in an 
effort to isolate the performance effects of employment practice bundles.  However, it did not focus on the ways 
that certain employment practices managed to “unlock” new technologies. 
7 
This study proffers an alternative explanation for the empirical elusiveness of the EI-
performance link.  It theorizes that the implementation of new technologies, IT in particular, 
offers one avenue by which EI positively influences performance, thereby filling a gap in the 
management literature left by scholars of ER, HR, and OB.  Taking an employment relations 
approach—characterized by organizational and phenomenological groundedness—it suggests 
that the deployment of an IT system offers opportunities for EI, and that those workplaces that 
successfully include workers in the deployment will show larger gains from the use of the new 
system than workplaces taking a more traditional, top-down approach—a process suggested by 
Mirvis, Sales, and Hackett (1991).  By drawing on what we already know about the ways 
employment practices complement new technologies, the theory begins to clarify the ambiguity 
of the EI-performance link in employment relations research.  Furthermore, the argument 
allows for a critique of the HR and OB literature’s very narrow framing of the technology 
construct, suggesting an additional contingency thus far largely ignored by these fields.  In 
particular, the questions of “when” and “how” to implement EI can be answered by taking more 
serious consideration of workplace technologies and technological change.  It appears that 
technology has not only been under-theorized by these fields, but that its omission has itself 
clouded attempts to link worker participation to performance measures. 
 
Technological and Organizational Context 
This study integrates technology and technological change into research on EI to show 
that the EI surrounding the deployment of a new IT system does, indeed, drive organizational 
performance.  One can think of EI as complementing IT in the production and delivery of 
healthcare services, which equates to EI moderating the relationship between IT and 
organizational performance.  Establishing this relationship reliably requires a deep 
understanding of the technology and of the organization and its workflows, something that 
existing studies of the effects of EI and IT on performance have been criticized for failing to do 
(e.g., Brown and Campbell 2002; Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson, and Strauss 1996).  
Consequently, I describe the EHR and EI systems and the Kaiser Permanente labor 
management partnership (LMP) in considerable detail here in order to provide the context 
needed to interpret the quantitative results that follow. 
 
Employee Involvement at Kaiser Permanente 
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Kaiser Permanente, the integrated health insurer and healthcare provider, was chosen 
for this study because it has been a forerunner in healthcare’s conversion from paper-based to 
electronic recordkeeping and has a history of promoting EI as part of an overall labor 
management partnership (Kochan, Eaton, McKersie, and Adler 2009).  Kaiser’s EHR system, 
KP HealthConnect, once fully-deployed, will include a full complement of interoperable 
administrative and clinical health IT applications.  One of these, which I refer to as the 
“scheduling module,” is used for scheduling office visits, procedures, and lab tests in each 
region’s outpatient or “ambulatory” clinics—essentially, large-scale doctors’ offices. 
The LMP is a cooperative arrangement between Kaiser Permanente and thirty union 
locals representing workers in seven of its eight regions (Kochan, Eaton, McKersie, and Adler 
2009).  As of 2008, the Coalition of Kaiser Permanente Unions (CKPU) and thus, the LMP, 
covers about 86,000 Kaiser employees.  The configuration of the CKPU replicates that of its 
management-side counterparts, creating labor-management “partners” at every level in every 
region in which the CKPU represents workers.  At the apex of the LMP in its Oakland-based 
office sits a representative from Kaiser—a senior vice president reporting directly to Kaiser’s 
COO—alongside the CKPU’s director. 
 
[—Insert Table 1 about here.—] 
 
The LMP funds a full-time KP HealthConnect union coordinator at the national level to 
represent the interests of the CKPU with respect to KP HealthConnect’s development, 
deployment, and ongoing use.  It also negotiated and now administers a national KP 
HealthConnect “Effects Bargain” agreement governing job and wage protections for workers as 
they relate to the KP HealthConnect initiative (See Table 1.).  Together, these provisions and 
personnel assignments establish the importance of labor to the KP HealthConnect initiative 
and seek to assure that KP HealthConnect will advance the interests of the workforce as it 
advances Kaiser’s goals.  Further, the agreement underlines the need for flexibility at all levels 
in processes and workflows and for the active involvement of labor representatives and 
frontline workers in developing and implementing KP HealthConnect.  In exchange, the 
document creates and funds regional KP HealthConnect union representatives to represent 
labor alongside IT and operations leads at the top of each region’s KP HealthConnect project 
team.  Among other protections, it makes guarantees with respect to training and preparation 
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as well as a commitment to mitigating the effects of staffing challenges that would inevitably 
occur in the run-up to implementation. 
The Effects Bargain established the creation of at least one, full-time, KP 
HealthConnect labor coordinator to serve on each regional KP HealthConnect leadership team.  
Since the labor coordinator was charged with monitoring KP HealthConnect-related service 
process and workflow change experiments and pilots, he or she also assumed responsibility for 
identifying and responding to demands for frontline worker involvement arising in the course 
of the initiative.  In the aggregate, Kaiser expected labor’s active involvement in configuring, 
implementing, and eventually, encouraging optimal use of KP HealthConnect. 
One of Kaiser’s regional operations, Kaiser Permanente of the Northwest, signaled its 
commitment to both the Partnership and to KP HealthConnect by funding two employees to 
serve as KP HealthConnect labor coordinators, each pulled directly from the bargaining unit.  
With clinical functionality largely in-place, the region turned to one of KP HealthConnect’s 
non-clinical applications, the scheduling module.  The labor coordinators assumed their 
positions on the local configuration team, alongside IT and operations leaders as well as 
programmers and application specialists.  They also began assembling a cadre of bargaining 
unit members to serve as “super-users.” 
Super-users were support staff end-users drawn from throughout the region.  At any 
one time, there were approximately 15-20 active super-users.  They were the first to learn how 
to use the scheduling module and served as liaisons between frontline support staff and the 
regional configuration team.  As the region grew closer to implementing the system in the 
spring and summer of 2005, super-users were temporarily transferred on a full-time basis from 
their regular roles on the front lines, allowing them to travel the region answering questions 
and facilitating the training of other bargaining unit members.  Much of what the super-users 
did was informal.  However, there were four main channels by which their participation—and 
by extension, the participation of all those frontline workers whom they touched—served to 
make the scheduling module more effective. 
First, during their travels throughout the region, they sought suggestions on how to 
improve the system or its rollout.  Through weekly meetings, they relayed this information to 
the labor coordinators, who ensured it was integrated into the planning being done by the 
regional leadership team.  It was through this process that frontline staff pointed out that the 
transition between scheduling systems could not be done in waves—by clinic, by department, 
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or by any way other than what would eventually be labeled a “big bang.”  This is because 
Kaiser patients, while assigned to a specific provider in a specific clinic, draw on services from 
many departments and often multiple facilities.  Aside from communicating this up to 
management through their labor coordinators, the super-users also made a related case with 
respect to training, also voiced at the strategic level by the regional labor coordinators: as a 
consequence of the decision to go with a “big bang” rollout, all end-users would have to be 
trained before “go-live.” 
Training was, in fact, the second area where super-users played a key role in the 
deployment of the scheduling module.  They worked with regional trainers to develop and lead 
sessions for their frontline co-workers.  This introductory training occurred mainly at the 
regional training facility, but called upon the super-users to scope out opportunities within the 
clinics to make sure staff were up and running on the technology.  Later on in the process, they 
played a similar dual role in follow-up or “optimization” training. 
Super-users were also charged with communicating information downward from 
regional leadership to those on the frontlines, a responsibility that often included as much 
justification as communication.  For example, management’s recognition that staff from all 
clinics would have to be trained before the rollout reinforced the need for some extra flexibility 
from the rank-and-file.  In particular, the short time frame meant that some training would 
have to occur in the evenings and on weekends, a decision that was not welcomed by the 
workforce. 
Finally, super-users provided ongoing, “just-in-time” support for co-workers not only 
around the time of the deployment, but thereafter as well.  These experts would eventually 
return to their jobs able to serve as their workplace’s de facto leaders and “go-to” people for all 
matters technological and work-related pertaining to the KP HealthConnect scheduling 
module.  Indeed, super-users played just as vital a role in the initiative when they returned 
fulltime to their regular positions.  Managers and frontline staff report their being in-demand 
as KP HealthConnect resource people in their clinics, providing co-workers with quick answers 
to the sorts of “just-in-time” questions that arose as those who were already formally-trained 
became everyday users. 
Despite the sturdy structure supporting the mandate for workforce participation, 
interviews with frontline staff in many clinics across multiple Kaiser regions revealed a great 
deal of variation in just how involved workers felt they were in the project.  This deviation 
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between stated policies and their impact on the ground is actually quite common in studies 
linking employment practices to performance (e.g., Bartel 2004; Jones, Kalmi, and Kauhanen 
2009).  However, within well-defined regional boundaries, there was little or no variation in 
attributes of the IT module itself—including when it “went live.”  Likewise, a host of 
contextual variables can be reasonably assumed not to vary within a single region.  This study 
exploits these advantageous, quasi-experimental conditions to undertake a more careful 
analysis of EI’s role in IT implementation than that permitted by the research designs 
employed in earlier studies (e.g., Mirvis, Sales, and Hackett 1991). 
 
Technology and Workflow at Kaiser Permanente 
Through interviews with managers and labor leaders in Kaiser’s national headquarters 
as well as those in multiple regions, the Northwest region’s scheduling module emerged as one 
with clear and measurable performance improvement expectations.  Furthermore, it was 
implemented in organizational units doing the same work and that were similar enough on 
other dimensions to provide for suitable comparisons.  Headquartered in the suburbs of 
Portland, Oregon, the region employs 880 physicians and 8,900 employees to serve just over 
480,000 “members” (i.e., patients).  The region spans the greater metropolitan Portland and 
Vancouver, Washington areas.  It offers “ambulatory” care through 27 outpatient medical office 
buildings, 15 of which serve as hubs for primary care—family practice, pediatrics, and internal 
medicine.2
The scheduling module addressed a very concrete set of organizational challenges—
inefficiencies and patient dissatisfaction with the appointment-setting process.  Among other 
challenges, those support staff charged with setting patient appointments using the legacy 
scheduling applications frequently found themselves asking even long-term Kaiser members for 
data that should be permanently linked to a member’s health record number (HRN), namely 
  The study focused on these primary care clinics, in part, because so many of the 
performance outcomes of interest to Kaiser are shaped by the member’s experience with his or 
her primary care physician (PCP).  Bounding the sample in this way also allowed the researcher 
to spend time in all of the clinics, accounting for or assuring the non-variation in contextual 
characteristics.  For example, including appointment-making procedures beyond primary care 
would introduce variation across specialties and ancillary services. 
                                                                
2 The term “outpatient” is often used to describe those patients expected to check-in and out of the hospital on the 
same day.  However, since this study does not address anything related to “inpatients” or hospital care, I use the 
adjectives “ambulatory” and “outpatient” interchangeably. 
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contact information.  The legacy system also made it difficult to schedule regularly recurring 
appointments and often lacked up-to-date information on providers’ availability vis-à-vis 
vacation scheduling, “panel support” time, or the use of planned or unplanned leave. 
To understand how this would have a negative impact on economic performance, 
consider the process by which members make a primary care appointment by phone.  They dial 
their clinic’s appointments line.  The call is received by a member intake specialist (MIS).  The 
MIS opens the schedule corresponding to the member’s PCP and searches for the first available 
appointment time or the first available time slot amenable to the member.  This only disposed 
of about 40 percent of cases.  More frequently, large sections of a provider’s schedule would be 
blocked as “unavailable” for one of the reasons listed above.  The MIS would then transfer the 
member to the medical assistant (MA) supporting the appropriate provider.  If the MA picked 
up, she could override or correct the schedule.  If instead the MA were unavailable or serving 
another patient in-person, the patient calling could leave a message.  If the patient ever called 
again, possibly returning a call from the MA, they would start all over again at the clinic’s call 
center, where the MIS would again try to make an appointment and would likely run into the 
same complication. 
The end result was that 75-80 percent of members initially denied an appointment 
would ultimately be given one within an acceptable time frame.  However, this chain of events 
came at the great expense of patient satisfaction with the appointment-making process.  
Furthermore, appointment-setting required 4-5 “touches” from more highly-paid MAs in 
addition to MISs, rather than the single touch of one MIS.  Effective use of the new scheduling 
module was expected to address this issue and the patient dissatisfaction that arose from it. 
 
Complementarity Between Employee Involvement and Information Technology 
At Kaiser, the new IT—the scheduling module—served as a tool for workers, providing 
them real-time, up-to-date information that facilitated their ability to better meet a strategic 
goal.  Therefore, one might expect that just turning the technology on—which occurred at the 
same time across all clinics examined—would boost performance.  While there was no inter-
clinic variation in when the IT “went-live,” there was variation in the levels of EI achieved in 
each clinic.  At some clinics, workers reported the frequent presence of and reliance upon so-
called super-users.  However, at other clinics, workers claimed not to have had their ideas or 
concerns solicited or considered or reported being trained not by a fellow frontline worker in 
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the form of a super-user, but rather by a manager or regional IT staffer.  This inter-clinic 
variation in EI is what enables the identification of the theorized complementarity between EI 
and IT.  While the IT might boost performance across-the-board, these improvements should 
be measurably larger under higher levels of EI.  Finally, as alluded to above, these quasi-
experimental conditions allow for an unprecedented, “apples to apples” comparison of before-
and-after effects in very similar organizational sub-units doing identical work and using the 
same new technology (cf. Mirvis, Sales, and Hackett 1991).  Furthermore, relative to the 
organizational processes examined by Edmondson et al. (2001; 2003), the simple nature of the 
work and the focus on two, relatively lateral jobs in the organizational hierarchy—MISs and 




For it to be true that EI facilitated the deployment of the scheduling module, it must be 
shown that variation in EI drives variation in performance.  This analysis does so by measuring 
the performance impact of the same technology—the scheduling module—in 16 clinics in the 
same regional operations of the same organization over a 35-month period beginning in 
October 2004 and ending August 2007.  Measures of IT “go-live” were constructed from 
interviews, archival data, and clinic observations.  Performance is measured using Kaiser’s 
Patient Satisfaction Survey, and EI is assessed using a new survey of employees designed 
specifically for this study.  Table 2 details all of the variables used in the quantitative analyses. 
 
[—Insert Table 2 about here.—] 
 
The analysis leverages the multi-method nature of the research in numerous ways.  It 
uses the rich qualitative information to understand the processes that generated the data and, 
more directly, to construct temporal variables, e.g., when the technology was “switched on.”  
This allows for a number of methodological benefits.  For example, qualitative research 
revealed why the scheduling module was such an attractive choice for in-depth study—its 
direct connection to a well-measured outcome of great interest to Kaiser managers.  Whether 
or not the new system was effective could be measured by patients’ perceptions of the 
appointment-making process.  Indeed, Kaiser had for many years collected patient-level data on 
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the appointment-setting process as part of a mailed paper-and-pencil Patient Satisfaction 
Survey sent shortly after an appointment.  Though the use of these types of “localized” 
performance measures poses a challenge for generalizability, a number of researchers have 
argued for their use on reliability grounds (e.g., Hunter and Pil 1995), claiming that they 
provide a more direct causal link than do financial performance measures.  Some researchers 
have chosen to use such measures even when more generalizable dollar figures could have been 
easily imputed (e.g., Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2007; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997; 
MacDuffie 1995). 
Due largely to the newness of the technology, Kaiser’s human resource records did not 
contain reliable measures of the flavor of EI examined here.  Though Kaiser conducts an annual 
poll of its employees, the instrument had only recently been augmented with a single and very 
broad question about the health IT system.  Therefore, the best option was to develop a new 
employee survey specifically for this study, ensuring that the EI measures were not about some 
broad EI construct, but about EI in the context of the deployment of this specific IT module.  
There are a number of advantages to surveying employees directly, and then aggregating these 
data to the clinic (i.e., establishment) level.  First, EI measures cannot be biased by individual, 
clinic-level managers wanting to offer an idealized account of EI (Jones, Kalmi, and Kauhanen 
2009).  Second, Huber and Power (1985) suggest that single-response bias be tackled by asking 
survey questions of the “most-informed respondent” in the establishment.  In this case, only 
those employees expected to use the scheduling module in the course of their everyday work 
are included in the analysis.  This technique also avoids “frame of reference” problems (Hunter 
and Pil 1995) by asking frontline workers the very EI-related questions that they should know 
the answers to—not questions about a broad EI construct.  Furthermore, Gerhart, Wright, 
MacMahan, and Snell (2000) suggest that drawing on multiple respondents from each 
establishment disposes of inter-rater reliability issues, though they also note that research 
designs bounded to a small number of clinics and a homogenous group of workers rarely suffer 
from this problem anyway.  Finally, perhaps the most significant methodological challenge to 
studies linking employment practice “inputs” to performance “outputs” occurs when the same 
instrument is used to collect both.  In this way, so-called “common method bias” generates 
artificially-inflated correlations between EI, IT use, and performance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, and Podsakoff 2003).  However, the research design here circumvents the causes of 
common method bias with its collection of the independent and dependent variables from 
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completely separate and unrelated sources—one long in existence for organizational use and 
another conceived of and administered years later purely for the purposes of this research. 
Having described and justified key methodological choices, I will next briefly explain 
the variables constructed from qualitative research—those picking up when the technology was 
turned on and those intended to control for random performance movements around the time 
the technology was turned on.  Likewise, there are variables to capture the trending of the 
performance variables, allowing for the separation of trend from the changes engendered by the 
use of the scheduling module.  Then, I describe in detail the Patient Satisfaction Survey and the 
employee survey and explain how relevant variables were constructed from questionnaire 
items.  I will then explain each of two separate estimation strategies that rely on these data, 
focusing on how these methods allow for two different paths toward identifying the moderating 
effects of EI on the effectiveness of the new technology. 
 
Performance Trends, Transition to the New Technology, and Module-in-Use 
The period of observation represented in the archival data is October 2004 to August 
2007—35 months.  It is important that the influence of trend over this period be controlled for 
in order to meaningfully identify the effects of the new technology.  Thus, the first linear time 
trend (“Time Trend”) begins with October 2004 and ends with August 2007.  The next step 
toward identifying the theorized effects is to identify the discontinuity in performance 
associated with turning the new technology on.  The scheduling module went live across all 
clinics observed at the end of July 2005.  Therefore, if we were using a single dummy variable 
to capture the discontinuity, then all months from August 2005 onward would be set to equal 
one.  However, in order to control for performance gyrations around “go-live,” the analysis 
presented here allows for June 2005, July 2005, August 2005 to be labeled “transition months.”  
That decision gets operationalized with the binary variable “Transition Period,” which equals 
zero for all months except June, July, and August 2005.  Therefore, “Module-in-Use” does not 
begin to take on the value of one until September 2005, just after the period of transition.  This 
was a conservative choice, since it potentially “dummies out” the benefits that would accrue 
from the IT being in use in July and August.  Changes in the number of transition months 
allowed for almost no difference at all in any of the subsequent estimates.  A second linear time 
trend—“Time Since ‘Go-Live’”—captures the month-to-month changes (as opposed to the 
structural break) associated with “go-live.”  Therefore, it carries a value of zero until September 
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2005.  In September 2005, the second linear time trend begins at one and increments up to 24 
for August 2007.  Thus, as operationalized in the paper, there are 8 pre-“go-live” months, 3 
transition months, and 24 post “go-live” months.3
 
 
Patient Satisfaction and Ease of Scheduling 
This study uses two items from the Patient Satisfaction Survey.  One question asks, 
“Were you able to get the appointment scheduled by talking to just one person?’’.  Another asks 
respondents to rate on a nine-point Likert-type scale their satisfaction “with the length of time 
spent on the phone to schedule the appointment.’’  These variables were strongly related.  
Those who answered “yes” for the binary performance item were, on average, more satisfied 
with the length of time required to make their the appointment ( 74.4t = , .001<p ), providing 
evidence of convergent validity for these performance measures (Furr and Bacharach 2008; 
Schwab 2005).  However, the difference in discreteness allows for two, separate paths towards 
statistical substantiation, to be explained below. 
With approximately 43,000 patient responses, the response rate for the survey was 35%, 
which stacks up favorably to comparable customer surveys administered by mail (Kaplowitz, 
Hadlock, and Levine 2004).  Though management could not provide the necessary data 
dismissing the possibility of response bias, this bias should be consistent over the time period 
studied.  Furthermore, the marketing literature suggests that disgruntled or dissatisfied 
patients may be more likely than others to respond to such surveys (Richins 1983).  To the 
extent that this is true and that the use of the technology dissatisfies patients, it only serves to 
make the statistical estimates more conservative, i.e., biased away from theorized results. 
 
Employee Involvement in IT Deployment 
As alluded to above, measures of EI were developed from an author-administered 
employee survey of MAs and MISs.  Responses to eight survey items were summed to 
construct the EI index.  The first four, items are: 1.) My suggestions relating to the design and 
improvement of [the scheduling module] have been valued., 2.) My issues or complaints about 
it have been ignored., 3.) There is at least one bargaining unit member in my office who helps 
me be a better user of [the scheduling module], and 4.) Before it was rolled out, the people 
                                                                
3 However, since the panel is unbalanced, the total number of observations is not simply equal to 16 clinics × 35 
months. 
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whose work would be affected were asked for guidance.  Each was answered using a seven-
point, Likert-type scale in which 7 represented strong agreement.  The second item was 
reverse-coded.  The remaining four items were binary in nature.  Respondents answered 
questions on whether or not a fellow member of the bargaining unit introduced them to the 
scheduling module, provided them with their follow-up training on the module, or otherwise 
served as an on-site expert or “super-user” for the scheduling module.  Respondents also 
answered yes or no as to whether they provided any specific recommendations on additional 
ways that the system could be used to meet its strategic goals.  As a further reliability check, 
the survey included an open-ended question asking workers to document a specific suggestion 
that they had made.  This step provided additional confidence that respondents understood 
exactly the kinds of EI they were being asked about (Hunter and Pil 1995). 
As noted above, the employee survey included questions derived from the author’s 
observations and interviews to measure EI relevant to employees in this particular 
organizational setting, similar to the methodological approach adopted by Bidwell (2009).  
According to Jarvis, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff (2003), the construction of formative indicators 
such as these rather than more traditional “reflective” measures makes sense when indicators 
“define” different aspects or dimensions of the construct and when indicators need not be 
interchangeable.  In Kaiser’s case, there were multiple ways in which workers might have 
participated in the IT initiative, and any one of them could effectively substitute for any other.  
For example, a worker may have been directly canvassed for their thoughts on effective system 
use.  Alternatively, they may have relied frequently on guidance from a super-user.  Summing 
answers into a composite measure therefore captures the overall level of EI in this context, 
even though there is no a priori reason to expect a high correlation between items (Bidwell 
2009).4
The survey was piloted on frontline workers in addition to union and management 
leaders, and then administered electronically through the organization’s intranet in Fall 2007—
shortly after the end of the constructed data series.  Organizational constraints prevented the 
survey from being run earlier or multiple times.  The survey achieved a response rate of 58 
percent—268 MAs and 128 MISs that use the technology in the course of their everyday work.  
Analyses confirmed that those MISs who responded had about the same average age and job 
 
                                                                
4 This scale proves only marginally reliable by conventional standards ( .58α = ).  Nonetheless, a low alpha does 
not indicate low reliability in the case of formative measures like that employed for EI (Bidwell 2009; Bollen and 
Lennox 1991; Jarvis, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff 2003). 
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tenure as those who did not.  The MA respondants had the same average tenures as their non-
responding colleagues.  However, those MAs who responded were marginally older, on 
average, than those that did not respond—41.8 years vs. 39.3 years ( 2.44t = , .01p < ).5  Not 
surprisingly, the number of responses from each clinic—ranging from eight to 43—was mainly 




I employ a two-prong approach to show that the use of the IT is associated with 
performance increases at the clinic level and that these effects are greater in those clinics with 
higher mean levels of EI.  The most straightforward way to demonstrate the moderating role 
of EI would be to collapse the data into a dataset of clinic-months, and then to regress each 
performance measure on a vector of independent variables.  These variables would include 
controls, namely for trend, but also main effects for IT “go-live” and for EI.  The focal 
explanatory variable would be the two-way, multiplicative interaction term crossing IT “go-
live” (i.e., “Module-in-Use”) with EI, and a statistically significant, positive coefficient estimate 
on this term would support the theory.  Indeed, with some modifications to account for the 
dependency structure of the data and performance gyrations right around the “go-live” month, 
this is essentially how the paper tests the impact of EI and IT on the continuous performance 
measure described above.  The findings would be more robust, however, if one could then 
replicate the analysis using the binary performance variable.  However, the key partial slope 
estimate is attached to the interaction term, and two-way, multiplicative coefficient estimates 
are inconsistent in the context of functional forms necessary for estimating binary dependent 
variables (Ai and Norton 2003; Jaccard 2001).  Therefore, the paper offers an alternative 
method—a plotting procedure—for testing the theory on the binary variable.7
 
 
Multilevel models.  As noted above, the most straightforward way to test the theory on 
the continuous variable is to create a dataset of clinic-months, and then to regress the 
continuous performance measure—patient satisfaction with the length of time required to make 
                                                                
5 I could not test for randomness with respect to sex.  However, nearly all of the MAs and MISs sampled were 
women. 
6 As noted earlier, the work of Gerhart and colleagues (2000) suggests that even a very small number of 
respondents should be enough to ensure reliability in studies like this one. 
7 One can run the plotting procedure on the continuous dependent variable, and the resulting scatterplot is 
qualitatively similar to the one that emerges when using the binary dependent variable. 
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an appointment—on a vector of independent variables.  This requires melding patients’ 
responses to the Patient Satisfaction Survey—the dependent variable—with employee 
responses to the employee survey—the independent variable.  Calculating the mean EI index 
for each clinic is straightforward.  Given that workers were only surveyed once, this measure is 
time-constant.  Aggregating the patient satisfaction data is only slightly more complicated.  
About 43,000 patient observations were linked to the specific PCP with whom the patient-
respondent made the appointment, and then these data were crossed with archival managerial 
data placing physicians into specific clinics over time.  Following Jones, Kalmi, and Kauhanen 
(2009) and Bartel (2004), I do this by taking the average of patient satisfaction responses by 
clinic by month, standardized—a method that further strengthens the reliability of these 
specific performance measures (Harter, Schmidt, and Hayes 2002).  The models include on the 
right-hand side the variables to capture trend (“Time Trend” and “Time Since Go-Live”) and 
transition (“Transition Period”) as well as the main effect of the new technology being in-use 
(“Module-in-Use”).  Finally, the focal independent variable is the two-way, multiplicative 
interaction of “Module-in-Use” with EI.  Whereas the point estimate on “Module-in-Use” will 
establish the influence of the scheduling module on performance, the estimate for the two-way 
interaction establishes the moderating impact of EI. 
Given the dependence structure of the data, the usual assumptions required of OLS do 
not hold.  In particular, one would expect that the error terms would be systematically 
correlated at the clinic level.  Accommodating this data structure requires a longitudinal model, 
multilevel in the sense that individual observations are of clinic-months “clustered” in clinics.  
Therefore, the models estimated here instead partition the variance term into a random effect at 
the clinic level in addition to the usual zero-expectation error term.  That is, the observations 
can be assumed independent conditional on the random effect, and the estimates can be 
interpreted with the same ease as typical OLS coefficients (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004).8
 
 
Scatterplot.  As noted above, the analysis seeks additional evidence by examining the 
longitudinal data on a binary performance measure—whether or not a patient respondent to 
the Patient Satisfaction Survey is able to schedule their appointment by speaking to just one 
person, an event that is theorized to be more likely to occur when the scheduling module is in-
place and being used effectively.  This is accomplished by running 14 separate logistic 
                                                                
8 The time-constant nature of the EI measure unfortunately precludes the estimation of clinic-level fixed effects 
with these data. 
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regressions—one for each clinic—using patient-level responses to the Patient Satisfaction 
Survey as the unit-of-observation.9
Each of these regressions yields a point estimate for “Module-in-Use” that can be 
interpreted as the clinic-specific performance effect of the scheduling module.  These point 
estimates are then plotted as a function of each clinic’s mean EI score, the same one used in the 
multilevel estimates above.  Support for the theory here takes the form of a scatterplot in which 
each dot represents one of the actual clinics under study.  There should be a discernible and 
obvious positive relationship between a clinic’s mean EI score and the size of the performance 
gain it achieves when the scheduling module gets turned on, even after having controlled for 
trend and transition. 
  These regressions include just four independent 
variables—the two time trends (“Time Trend” and “Time Since ‘Go-Live’”) and the two IT-
related dummies (“Module-in-Use” and “Transition Period”). 
 
Results 
Table 3 presents summary statistics from the survey of the Northwest’s support staff.  
Recall that means are calculated using only responses from those MAs and MISs expected to 
use the scheduling module in the course of their work.  The first set of variables represents the 
four continuous items contributing to the EI scale.  Notice how in all four cases, means hover 
near the neutral response (4 = “neither agree nor disagree”), albeit with significant variation 
about the mean.  Overall, only 11 percent of respondents claimed that they were first 
introduced to the technology by a fellow member of the bargaining unit (as opposed to a 
manager or an IT staffer), though 18 percent asserted that they had, in fact, received follow-up 
training from a co-worker.  About 40 percent noted the importance of “super-users”—fellow 
members of the bargaining unit pulled from their regular, frontline positions to assist in the 
development and deployment of the system—to their successful use of the scheduling module.  
Interestingly, about 15 percent of respondents have made specific recommendations of ways 
that the system could be used more effectively, the details of which were validated with the 
responses to a free-form text field included in the survey.  For example, some workers 
suggested the need for “write” privileges in addition to “read-only” privileges at certain screens.  
Others pointed out the need to make sure that a patient’s contact details remain on-screen 
                                                                
9 While there are 16 clinics under study, the estimates sometimes include only 14 or 15 clinics, depending on the 
particular model.  This is because the Peterson clinic closed prior to the collection of quantitative measures of EI, 
and the Ulrich clinic opened too late in the observation period to provide pre-“go-live” observations. 
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throughout the appointment-setting process or the need to allow the home phone number field 
to be left empty for those patients having only a cell phone.  Others had suggested the creation 
of shortcuts for frequently-used “bundles” of mouse clicks, like those required to make certain, 
regularly-occurring types of office visit appointments. 
 
[—Insert Table 3 about here.—] 
 
Table 4 breaks out the dependent variables for each (de-indentified and relabeled) clinic, 
derived from patient-level data.  The first three columns focus on the binary dependent 
variable—whether or not the patient was able to make an appointment with the first person he 
or she spoke to on the telephone.  In the Bruford clinic, for example, of 3,911 patient responses 
to the question over the observation period (October 2004 to August 2007), 78 percent 
answered affirmatively.  Note that most of the clinics average around 80 percent for this 
variable over the period of observation.  The one exception appears to be Collins, which only 
managed to schedule appointments with one “touch” 73 percent of the time.  The next three 
columns repeat the exercise for the continuous dependent variable—patient’s satisfaction with 
the length of the phone call required to make the appointment.  In this case, the variable was 
standardized such that the mean was equal to zero and the standard deviation equal to one.  
Therefore, each clinic’s mean for the variable as reported in Table 4 is relative to the overall 
sample average.  The Fleetwood clinic averaged .2 standard deviations above the sample mean, 
the highest of all the clinics.  The clinic labeled Mullen achieved the lowest performance and 
the widest variation on this metric over the sample period. 
 
[—Insert Table 4 about here.—] 
 
Table 5 displays the multilevel models estimated on the dataset of clinic-months, 
beginning with a simple model considering only the effects of a linear time trend.  The first 
model shows a small, but statistically significant month-to-month increase in the dependent 
variable between October 2004 and August 2007.  Once a separate, post-implementation trend 
is added on the right-hand side (in the second model), the estimated partial slope on the 
original time trend turns negative and remains so for the remaining models to be estimated.  
The post-implementation time trend (“Time Since ‘Go-Live’”), however, that first appears in 
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the second model reveals a positive association between the use of the scheduling module and 
the performance measure it was intended to influence.  Despite the negative, month-to-month 
effect of the overall time trend (“Time Trend”), the post-implementation time trend is actually 
positive and remains so for all subsequent estimates.  Consistent with anecdotal accounts, 
customer service was suffering prior to the implementation of the scheduling module, a trend 
that reversed itself with the transition to the new system.  Moreover, without the new 
technology, it appears that month-to-month performance would have continued to decline.  
The next model adds two dummy variables capturing transition to (“Transition Period”) and 
deployment of the scheduling module (“Module-in-Use”).  Both estimates are positive and 
statistically significant in this and the remaining models.  Also note the point estimate on the 
post-implementation time trend doubles.  That means that once one accounts for a structural 
break in the time series, one can see evidence of a large (.44 standard deviations), one-time jump 
in performance as well as a steady, sizable (.06 standard deviations) month-to-month 
performance increase associated with the scheduling module, despite what would otherwise be a 
declining performance function (-.05 standard deviations each month) over time.  These effects 
are not sensitive to changes in the way the transition period is operationalized, e.g., one month 
or two months on either side of the transition from legacy systems to the new IT. 
 
[—Insert Table 5 about here.—] 
 
The last two models in Table 5 incorporate the effects of EI on the effectiveness of the 
technology.  Model 4 incorporates only a main effect for EI.  Interestingly, this predictor has an 
estimated performance effect that is insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that the 
impact of EI comes not through an engaged workforce per se, but from the moderating impact 
of EI with respect to the scheduling module initiative.  It is also worth noting that the inclusion 
of the EI variable in the fourth model does virtually nothing to the point estimates of all those 
variables carried over from the three versions of the equation previously estimated.  The fifth 
and final model in Table 4 adds the two-way interaction to directly capture the incremental, 
moderating effect of EI on the IT-performance link.  Controlling for all of the other effects, an 
increase of one standard deviation in the EI index increases the effectiveness of the technology 
by .27 standard deviations.  Interestingly, the estimate for the main EI measure turns negative, 
further demonstrating that EI’s performance impact appears to come through its moderation of 
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the scheduling module’s effect on performance.  The results are also robust to many different 
ways of operationalizing the EI measure. 
The second bit of evidence comes from the scatterplot.  Figure 1 projects the point 
estimates for “Module-in-Use” for each clinic—derived from the 14 separate logit estimates—
on a scatterplot as a function each clinic’s mean EI score.  First, notice that accounting for 
trend and transition, none of the clinics witnessed a performance decrement arising from the 
technology, and three of them increased their performance by at least one standard deviation.  
More important, the figure reveals a positive association between workers’ involvement in the 
IT effort and the size of performance improvements: those clinics whose workers reported 
greater mean EI levels with respect to the technology saw greater performance improvements 
arising from the technology than those clinics with lower mean EI scores.  Once again, the 
shape of the point cloud—revealing the positive association between the size of a clinic’s IT-
engendered performance gain and its mean level of EI—is robust to different 
operationalizations of EI.  That is, similar point clouds emerge when the same exercise is 
performed with the individual variables that make up the EI index. 
 
[—Insert Figure 1 about here.—] 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Though employment relations has long acknowledged the role of technology in its 
theory-building (e.g., Dunlop 1958 [1993]; Slichter 1941; Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960), 
that focus has been largely limited to trade union responses to new technologies that were 
intended to serve as substitutes for labor.  This oversight is particularly interesting given the 
attention that industrial relations theory has long given to the “technological context” for 
employment relations.  As IT and other new technologies become even more ubiquitous, 
employment relations scholars would do well to look within both the IT and EI processes at 
work to better understand how and why they interact to affect performance outcomes.  
Inasmuch as this study illustrates the ways that a union-management-negotiated agreement 
and participatory employment practices enable workers to use IT more effectively, it focuses 
explicitly on the ways that employment practices influence the effectiveness of new 
technologies intended to make workers more productive.  Moreover, it does so by leveraging 
the multi-method, organizationally-grounded approach indicative of employment relations to 
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show how one healthcare organization used EI to achieve larger returns from newly-deployed 
IT.  Therefore, it sheds light on the moderating role that aspects of the employment 
relationship play in linking technology to performance. 
The design of the study allows for a clean separation of the technology inputs from the 
EI inputs that management theory suggests complement one another in production.  The great 
benefit of IT is that it makes more information available to frontline workers (Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002; Brynjolfsson and Mendelson 1993).  However, pushing 
information downward and outward—in this case, up-to-date information on patients and on 
physician availability—will do much less to influence performance if those workers who will 
need to use the technology cannot shape how it is used and are not “brought on board” with 
clear communication from managers and union representatives.  For example, with respect to 
the scheduling module at Kaiser, aspects of the technology and of the organization necessitated 
that some training had to occur outside of regular working hours, and the labor coordinators 
and the super-users played a key role in justifying this unpopular decision to the region’s 
workforce. 
More specifically, Kaiser Permanente’s deployment of its scheduling module, one 
component of its much larger EHR system, was associated with clinic-level performance 
improvements.  However, these improvements were more than 50% greater in those clinics in 
which workers scored one standard deviation greater than average on a contextual measure of 
EI.  It appears that while the scheduling module provided workers across all the clinics 
additional, real-time information on provider availability and patient information, employees 
made better use of that information when they understood management’s strategic rationale for 
the system, when they were able to communicate their own ideas and concerns back up to the 
strategic level, and, most critically, when they were availed fellow frontline workers who could 
ease them through the deployment process. 
As a result of this study, we know that EI in implementation moderates the performance 
effects of IT.  While earlier empirical work suggested the importance of EI in this way (Mirvis, 
Sales, and Hackett 1991), the relationship had yet to be demonstrated by looking at the 
effectiveness of identical technology, with people doing the same work, in nearly identical 
workplaces, over time, under varying levels of employee involvement. 
Scholars of OB should welcome these findings.  They offer a much-needed explanation 
for the persistence of EI structures and processes despite a lack of empirical evidence in their 
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favor (Locke and Schweiger 1979).  Rather than proposing a contingency along the lines of 
those already considered such as characteristics of the workers themselves (e.g., Miller and 
Monge 1986) or aspects of the type of knowledge required to do the work (Latham, Winters, 
and Locke 1994; McCaffrey, Faerman, and Hart 1995; Scully, Kirkpatrick, and Locke 1995), 
this paper suggests that the new technology is itself a channel through which EI influences 
performance.  Therefore, these findings fold into an emerging stream of the OB literature 
considering the ways that social structure, organizational attributes, or attributes of the work 
itself moderate the link between new technologies and organizational performance 
(Edmondson, Bohmer, and Pisano 2001; Edmondson, Winslow, Bohmer, and Pisano 2003).  In 
this case however, the grounded nature of the research suggests that social structure and 
aspects of the work itself are not the factors driving IT’s effectiveness.  Rather, it is variation in 
EI around implementation that moderated the IT-performance link. 
While this result informs any management-related discipline with an interest in EI, it 
should perhaps raise the biggest alarm for the HR literature.  As noted earlier, despite a deep 
interest in EI, HR as a field practically ignores technology as an object of study (cf. Batt 1999).  
This study shows that technology must be examined in-depth as an avenue through which EI 
can drive organizational performance.  Recall from the last two columns of Table 5 that the 
direct effects of EI on performance are insignificantly different from zero, particularly in the 
fourth model, the one that does not include the two-way interaction term.  Had the subsequent 
model never been estimated, the “non-results” would be broadly consistent with findings to 
date regarding EI.  That is, the performance effects of EI in this context would be nil, 
consistent the direction of empirical work to date (e.g., Cappelli and Neumark 2001; Freeman 
and Kleiner 2000).  However, after estimating the final model, the penultimate model appears to 
suffer from measurement error, effectively averaging the direct effect of EI on performance 
with the influence of EI that occurs through the effective implementation of the new system.  
Once both effects are accounted for, the direct effect of EI becomes only slightly more precise, 
and interestingly, negative—though not at conventional levels of statistical significance.  
Those positive performance effects resulting from EI appeared to arise entirely through the 
interaction of the IT variable and the EI measure. 
One might challenge these results on a number of grounds.  The issues of reliability and 
construct validity are the most critical, in part because both the EI and performance measures 
were developed or chosen specifically for this study rather than taken from previously validated 
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instruments.  The resulting EI measures were those that emerged as important to the effective 
use of this technology in this setting.  Likewise, the performance measures were chosen for 
their tight coupling with the effective use of the scheduling module.  With respect to 
endogeneity, one might argue that those clinics that were “ready” for the technology based on 
observed measures of EI or some other unobserved factors, not surprisingly, were able to use 
the technology more effectively.  With respect to these issues, reliance on qualitative 
investigation in addition to the statistical estimates offers some assurance of the findings’ 
overall validity.  For example, it was the deliberative, pre-statistical investigative process that 
determined that the “go-live” date was set at the regional level and was not chosen clinic-by-
clinic based on each clinic’s readiness.  Finally, given the unique features of the Kaiser labor 
management partnership, further work is needed to determine if similar effects are observed in 
more traditional, unionized settings and/or in nonunion settings that provide other employee 
voice arrangements.  However, it is reasonable to believe that even nonunion workplaces can 
identify and select frontline workers to support an implementation effort like the one described 
here.  In fact, such workplaces have clearly become the drivers of employment practice 
innovations, including the growth of various forms of EI (e.g., Bryson, Gomez, Kretschmer, and 
Willman 2007; Osterman 1994; Osterman 2000).  Broadening or redirecting these programs to 
encompass IT implementations should be something that could be done at relatively low cost, a 
result with obvious implications for managers as well as for future research. 
This study sheds some much-needed light on IT and EI in the service sector and 
outside of manufacturing, the sector that has been the focus of most of the empirical work to 
date on the employment practice correlates of organizational performance.  Therefore, not only 
do the results offer a lens into the service sector and “service processes” (as opposed to 
manufacturing’s “production processes”) more broadly, but they also inform the fastest growing 
sector of the US economy—healthcare. 
The immediate implication for both policymakers and healthcare administrators is that 
health IT can improve organizational outcomes.  Therefore, it makes sense that the 
government should promote the diffusion of EHRs and related technologies, and it makes sense 
for practices and physicians to respond accordingly to those incentives.  However, policies that 
seek only to encourage the adoption of health IT as opposed to the adoption of both the 
technology and the employment practices that more-fully “unlock” it are, at best, incomplete.  
Such costly mandates—like those that appear in the 2009 stimulus package—should also 
27 
include language to encourage the adoption of employment involvement structures and 
processes along the lines of those taken up in the case presented above. 
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Table 1.  Highlights of the KP HealthConnect Effects Bargaining Agreement Between Kaiser 
Permanente and the Coalition of Kaiser Permanente Unions. 
 
 Coalition agrees to:  Kaiser agrees to: 




and the full 




 • extend existing 
language on 
flexibility and job 
and wage security 
to changes 
engendered by new 
technology. 










Joint commitment to create “an 
environment where all 
staff…freely engage in the 
transformation effort.” 
• follow a process for 
incorporating into 
the bargaining unit 
new jobs created 
by the technology. 
 • fund KP 
HealthConnect 
labor coordinators 
in each region and 
for release, backfill, 
and training 
demands arising 
from the initiative. 
          
Source:  KP HealthConnect Effects Bargain, effective April 5th, 2005. 
 
 
 Variable Description Source
Employee Involvement index sum of responses to 8 survey items (listed below) employees
suggestions have been valued
answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale in which 1 = "strongly disagree" and 7 =  "strongly agree", 
and then standardized employees
issues have been ignored
answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale in which 1 = "strongly disagree" and 7 =  "strongly agree", 
and then standardized, with coding subsequently reversed employees
unionized super-user improves my use
answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale in which 1 = "strongly disagree" and 7 =  "strongly agree", 
and then standardized employees
affected staff were asked for guidance
answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale in which 1 = "strongly disagree" and 7 =  "strongly agree", 
and then standardized employees
introduced to technology by a union member
binary variable created from a question allowing respondents to choose between a fellow union 
member, a member of the IT staff, or a manager employees
received follow-up training from a union member
binary variable created from a question allowing respondents to choose between a fellow union 
member, a member of the IT staff, or a manager employees
relies on a "super-user" in their clinic binary created from a yes-or-no question employees
made specific recommendations for effective use binary created from a yes-or-no question employees
made appointment with first person spoken to binary created from a yes-or-no question patients
satisfaction with length of phone call required to 
make appointment
answered on a 9-point Likert-type scale in which 1 = "extremely dissatisfied" and 9 =  "extremely 
satisfied", and then standardized patients
Time Trend
linear time trend beginning with the first month of data, i.e., October 2004 = 1, November 2004 = 2, 
…, August 2007 = 35
interviews, archival records, and 
clinic observation
Transition Period
dummy variable to capture performance fluctuations around the time of "Go-Live"; set to 0 for all 
months except June, July, and August 2005
interviews, archival records, and 
clinic observation
Module-in-Use
dummy variable to capture the effects of "Go-Live"; set to 0 until September 2005, and then set to 1 
for all months until the end of the observation period
interviews, archival records, and 
clinic observation
Time Since "Go-Live"
linear time trend beginning with the first month in which September 2005 = 1, October 2005 = 2, …, 
August 2007 = 24
interviews, archival records, and 
clinic observation
Table 2 .  Definitions of Variables.
 
  
 Variable Mean Std. Dev.
suggestions have been valued 3.99 1.53
issues have been ignored 3.57 1.65
unionized super-user improves my use 4.01 1.77
affected staff were asked for guidance 3.77 1.52
introduced to technology by a union member 0.11 0.31
received follow-up training from a union member 0.18 0.39
relies on a "super-user" in their clinic 0.39 0.49
made specific recommendations for effective use 0.15 0.36
Table 3 .  Descriptive Statistics for Worker-Level Variables Included in 
the Employee Involvement Index.
Notes: Values based on responses from those medical assistants (MAs)
and member intake specialists (MISs) reporting expected use of the
system (n = 396). The first four components of the EI index were
answered on a seven-point, Likert-type scale in which 1 = "strongly
disagree" and 7 = "strongly agree", though the values for the second
item have been reversed for ease of comparison. The remaining four




 Clinic Name Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. n
Bruford 0.78 0.41 3,911 -0.07 1.01 4,051
Collins 0.73 0.44 1,992 0.01 1.00 2,078
Copeland 0.81 0.40 2,755 0.004 0.99 2,864
Dolenz 0.79 0.41 3,898 0.04 0.96 4,056
Escovedo 0.80 0.40 2,925 0.09 0.97 3,016
Fleetwood 0.80 0.40 2,948 0.20 0.93 3,046
Henley 0.80 0.40 3,237 0.09 0.97 3,371
Mullen 0.78 0.41 992 -0.10 1.05 1,028
Peart 0.77 0.42 2,967 -0.02 0.97 3,084
Peterson 0.79 0.40 932 -0.04 1.04 976
Schock 0.80 0.40 2,771 -0.05 1.02 2,898
Slichter 0.79 0.41 2,825 -0.08 1.02 2,921
Starkey 0.79 0.40 2,884 -0.07 1.04 3,018
Torres 0.77 0.42 2,829 -0.03 1.01 2,992
Ulrich 0.82 0.38 245 0.08 0.90 255
Watts 0.80 0.40 3,070 -0.07 1.04 3,194
Notes : Values based on responses to Patient Satisfaction Survey. The first variable—"made
appointment with first person spoken to"—is binary. The second variable—"satisfaction with
length of phone call required to make appointment"—is standardized at mean zero and a standard
deviation of one. Survey responses were collected over a 35 month period from October 2004 to
August 2007.
Table 4 .  Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables, by Clinic.
made appointment with first 
person spoken to
satisfaction with length of phone 






 Variables 1 2 3 4 5
Time Trend 0.01*** -0.01** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(6.98) (-2.73) (-5.21) (-4.87) (-5.03)
Time Since "Go-Live" 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(4.97) (5.65) (5.30) (5.46)
Transition Period 0.15* 0.15* 0.15*
(2.26) (2.25) (2.36)
Module-in-Use 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.42***
(6.31) (5.87) (6.02)
Employee Involvement 0.03 -0.14
(0.43) (-1.89)
Module-in-Use × Employee Involvement 0.27***
(4.06)
n 496 496 496 468 468
clusters 16 16 16 15 15
R 2 .11 .16 .26 .25 .28
Table 5 .  IT and Employee Involvement as Determinants of Patient Satisfaction with 
Length of Phone Call Required to Make an Appointment for an Office Visit.
Notes: Multilevel random effects regression with significance tests performed using
robust standard errors. Dependent variable is mean patient satisfaction with the length
of time it took to make an appointment by telephone for each clinic in a given month.
Since n represents clinic-months and "clusters" is the number of distinct clinics included
in each estimate, their quotient represents the mean number of months of data supplied
by each clinic. In the first model, for example, each clinic contributes, on average, 31
months of data.





Figure 1.  Scatterplot of Performance Gain at Scheduling Module “Go-Live” as a Function of 
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